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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
NEW KIDS ON THE BLOCK v. NEWS 
AMERICA PUBLISHING, INC.: NEW 
NOMINATIVE USE DEFENSE INCREASES 
THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION 
SURROUNDING THE FAIR USE DEFENSE 
TO TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In The New Kids on the Block v. News America Publish-
ing, Inc./ the Ninth Circuit held that two newspapers which ran 
polls to gauge the popularity of a musical group were not liable 
for trademark infringement.2 The decision by the Ninth Circuit 
panel articulated a new defense to a charge of trademark in-
fringement: the nominative fair use defense.3 
The Ninth Circuit's holding distinguishes between situa-
tions in which a defendant is using a rival's trademark to de-
scribe his own product and those in which he is describing the 
1. The New Kids on the Block v. News America Publishing, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (per Kozinski, J., joined by Schroeder, J. and Orrick, District Judge for the 
N.D. of Cal., sitting by designation). 
2. ld. at 308. A trademark is a limited property right in a particular word, phrase or 
symbol. See Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 900 
(9th Cir. 1992). The purpose of a trademark is to identify the manufacturer or sponsor of 
a good or the provider of a service. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305. The most common exam· 
pie of trademark infringement occurs when a competitor misappropriates a rival's trade-
mark and places it on his own goods. ld. Thus, one of the primary goals of trademark law 
is to prevent producers from free-riding on their rivals' marks. ld.; see infra notes 100-
112 for a more detailed explanation of trademark infringement law. 
3. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
685 
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rival's product by reference to the trademark.· In the first situa-
tion, the defendant may invoke the traditional "fair use" de-
fense. 1i The second situation forms the basis for the Ninth Cir-
cuit's new "nominative use" defense. 6 
The Ninth Circuit explained that if the following three re-
quirements are met, nominative use constitutes a defense to 
trademark infringement:' (1) the product or service must not be 
readily describable without using the trademark, (2) only so 
much of the trademark may be used as is reasonably necessary 
to identify the product or services, and (3) the user must do 
nothing in conjunction with the trademark as to suggest en-
dorsement by the trademark holder.s 
An explanation of trademark infringement and traditional 
defenses to trademark infringement, with focus on the fair use 
defense, follows. Through a comparison of the nominative use 
defense to the traditional fair use defense, this article will 
demonstrate that the nominative use defense is an unnecessary 
and confusing addition to trademark law. 
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The plaintiffs, The New Kids on the Block (hereinafter 
"New Kids"), are a popular musical group9 consisting of five 
popular teenaged musicians. 
The defendants, THE STAR and USA TODAY, are newspapers 
4.Id. 
5. The fair use defense applies when "the name, term, or device charged to be an 
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his 
own business, or of the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a 
term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe 
the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin .... " 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1115(b)(4) (1988). For a more detailed explanation, see infra notes 70-95 and accom-
panying text. 
6. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. Nominative use refers to use of a trademark by some-
one other than its owner where the trademark is the only word reasonably available to 
refer to the plaintiff or the plaintiff's product. For a more detailed explanation, see infra 
notes 113-117 and accompanying text. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
. 9. Id. at 304. There are over 500 products or services bearing the New Kids 
trademark. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss3/8
1994] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 687 
with national circulation.10 Both defendants operated "900" 
phone numbers which charged their readers a fee for calling in 
response to questions contained in their newspaper polls.11 The 
USA TODAY ad contained a picture of the New Kids and asked, 
"Who's the best on the block?" and "New Kids on the Block are 
pop's hottest group. Which of the five is your fave? Or are they a 
turn off?!I12 The ad proclaimed that any profits would go to 
charity.13 At fifty cents per call, less than $300 was generated. 14 
The ad in THE STAR contained a picture of the New Kids 
and asked, "Now which kid is the sexiest?!I16 It also contained a 
story about the New Kids that asked, "Which of the New Kids 
on the Block would you most like to move next door? STAR 
wants to know which cool New Kid is the hottest with our read-
ers."18 At ninety-five cents per minute, the ad generated about 
$1600.17 
The New Kids filed suit in federal district court, alleging 
the newspapers violated trademark infringement laws by using 
the New Kids' trademark in connection with the '900" number 
telephone polls.18 The complaint alleged ten causes of action:19 
(1) common-law trademark infringement,20 (2) Lanham Act false 
10. Ed. 
11. Ed. Telephone "900" number services can be used in a variety of ways. They can 
provide callers with recorded information, allow callers to engage in conversation on a 
party line, or record information spoken by the caller. Callers operate the services by 
punching in the appropriate numbers on the telephone key pad. Users of "900" numbers 
are then charged a fee for the service. The New Kids on the Block v. News America 
Publishing, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1540, 1542 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
12. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
13. Ed. 
14. Ed. The district court's opinion indicates that callers were charged fifty cents a 
minute. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1542. The Ninth Circuit opinion quotes the ad as 
stating, "Each call costs 50 cents." New Kids, 745 F.2d at 304. 
15. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
16. Ed. 
17. Ed. It is unclear whether the profits from this ad were also intended to go to 
charity. See id. 
18. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. 1540. 
19. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 304-05. Although the New Kids alleged ten causes of 
action, the district court never evaluated those claims on their merits because the district 
court granted summary judgment in favor of the newspaper defendants on other 
grounds. Ed. at 305. 
20. California common-law trademark infringement occurs when a trademark or 
trade name is appropriated and used as such. Kelley Blue Book v. Car-Smarts, Inc., 802 
F. Supp. 278, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1992). 
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advertising,21 (3) Lanham Act false designation of origin,22 (4) 
Lanham Act unfair competition,23 (5) state trade name infringe-
ment,24 (6) state false advertising,2~ (7) state unfair competi-
tion,26 (8) commercial misappropriation,27 (9) common-law mis-
appropriation,28 and (10) intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage.29 
21. False Advertising under the Lanham Act consists of the following elements: (1) 
the defendant made false statements in its advertisements, (2) the statements a~e decep-
tive, (3) the deception is material, (4) the defendant caused the falsely advertised goods 
to enter interstate commerce, and (5) the plaintiff has been injured by diversion of sales 
or loss of goodwill. Cook, Perkiss and Liehe, Inc. v. Northern Cal. Coli. Serv., Inc., 911 
F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Skil Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 375 F. Supp. 777, 
783 (N.D. Ill. 1974)). 
22. False designation of origin under the Lanham Act consists of making any false 
or misleading representation in connection with goods which is likely to cause confusion 
or mistake as to their origin. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(l) (1992). 
23. Unfair competition under the Lanham Act occurs when any person who, on or in 
connection with goods or services, uses any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 
false designation of origin, any false or misleading representation, or description of fact 
which is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as to the affiliation, connection, 
or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval or his or her goods, services, or commercial activities. Shakespeare Co. v. Sil-
star Corp. of Am., 802 F. Supp. 1386, 1399 (D. S.C. 1992) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) 
(1988)). 
24. A trade name is a word, name, symbol, or device used to identify a business, 
vocation or occupation. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14208 (1987). The theory of trademark 
and trade name infringement is that the seller is diverting business from his competitor 
by passing off or fraudulently representing his goods to be those of the competitor. BER-
NARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 83 at 761 (1990). 
25. False advertising consists of making representations in advertisements that mis-
lead the public. See MAl Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 523 (9th Cir. 
1993). 
26. Unfair competition occurs when no valid trademark, copyright, or patent exits in 
a particular name or design, the goods or services are known to the public by such a 
name, design, or physical appearance, and the defendant imitates the name, design, or 
physical appearance such that buyers may be deceived as to the origin of the goods or 
services. BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Equity § 86 at 762-63 
(1990). 
27. Commercial misappropriation occurs when a person knowingly uses the name, 
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness of another on goods for the purpose of advertis-
ing or selling, without the person's consent. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (1984). 
28. Common law misappropriation of name or likeness consists of the following ele-
ments: (1) the defendant used the plaintiff's identity, (2) the appropriation of the plain-
tiff's name or likeness was to the defendant's advantage, (3) lack of consent, and (4) 
resulting injury. Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing 
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, § 117 at 804-07 (4th ed. 1971); BERNARD E. WITKIN, CAL. PRO-
CEDURE, Pleading § 606 at 2244 (2d ed. 1971)). 
29. Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage consists of the fol-
lowing elements: (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and some third per-
son with the possibility of benefit to the plaintiff, (2) knowledge by the defendant of the 
relationship, (3) intentional acts by the defendant to disrupt the relationship, (4) actual 
4
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The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the newspaper defendants on First Amendment grounds.30 The 
basis of the decision was that "news-gathering" is protected by 
the First Amendment, precluding a finding of trademark 
infringement.31 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
A trademark holder can make out a prIma facie case of 
trademark infringement by proving three elements:32 (1) that 
the trademark in question is a valid, legally protectable trade-
mark,33 (2) that the plaintiff is the owner of the trademark,34 
and (3) that the defendant's use of the mark or a similar mark 
created a likelihood of confusion as to the origin of the goods. 311 
Under the Lanham Act,36 a trademark holder who has regis-
tered37 a trademark has a remedy for trademark infringement if 
the defendant has used the mark or a similar mark in connection 
with the sale of goods or services in a way that is likely to cause 
confusion.38 Registration of the mark, therefore, is presu~ed to 
disruption of the relationship, and (5) damages to the plaintiff caused by the defendant's 
acts. Morningstar, Inc., v. Superior Court, No. B075691, 1994 WL 86169, at '13 (Cal. 
App. 2 Dist. March 18, 1994) (citing Blank v. Kirwan, 703 P.2d 58, 70 (1985». 
30. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305. 
31. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547. 
32. See Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 802 F. Supp. 1386, 1394 (D.S.C. 
1992) (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 373 (1991). 
33. That the trademark must be a valid, legally protectable mark means that the 
trademark must be capable of serving to identify and distinguish one producer's goods in 
commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1988). 
34. The plaintiff must be the owner of the property right allegedly infringed to 
bring suit. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1992). 
35. Likelihood of confusion means that the similarity of the trademarks is likely to 
confuse customers about the source of the products. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 
6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing E & J Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 
1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 1990». The factors include: the strength of the mark, the proximity 
of the marks, the similarity of the marks, evidence of actual confusion, marketing chan-
. nels used, type of goods, degree of care likely to be used by a purchaser, defendant's 
intent in selecting a mark and likelihood of expansion of product lines. Official Airline 
Guides, 6 F.2d at 1391 (citing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th 
Cir. 1979». 
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1992) (covering trademarks). 
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1992) (covering federal registration of trademarks). 
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1992). 
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establish the first two elements of trademark infringement.39 
Once a trademark has been registered and used continuously for 
five years, it becomes incontestable.40 Incontestability is deemed 
conclusive evidence of the first two elements.41 
B. REBUTTING A PRIMA FACIE CASE 
A trademark infringement suit may be rebutted by attack-
ing any element that is necessary to the plaintiff's case. Because 
likelihood of confusion is always an element of the plaintiff's 
prima facie case, a defendant in a trademark infringement ac-
tion may rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by showing that 
the defendant's use was not confusing to consumers.42 
R. G. Smith v. Chanel, Inc. 43 is a Ninth Circuit case in 
which the plaintiff failed to show likelihood of confusion. In 
R. G. Smith, the plaintiff produced a perfume under the trade-
mark "Chanel No.5."" The defendant sold a competing per-
fume under the name "Second Chance."411 In an advertisement 
directed at wholesale purchasers, the defendant claimed that its 
perfume duplicated the scent of the plaintiff's perfume.46 The 
advertisement suggested that a blindfold test be used on pro-
spective customers where they were dared to "detect any differ-
ence between" Chanel No.5, which sold for $25.00, and Second 
Chance, which sold for $7.00.47 
39. Shakespeare, 802 F. Supp. at 1394. 
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1988). 
41. Shakespeare, 802 F. Supp. at 1394 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor 
Prods. Inc. 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir. 1991». See also 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) ("To the 
extent that the right to use the registered mark has become incontestable under section 
1065 of this title, the registration shall be conclusive evidence of the validity of the regis-
tered mark and of the registration of the mark, of the registrant's ownership of the mark, 
and of the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark .... "). 
42. See Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., 935 F02d 1122, 1123 (10th 
Cir. 1991) (holding an absence of likelihood of confusion caused the plaintiff's claims to 
fail, so that there was no need to consider affirmative defenses); see also Venetianaire 
Corp. of America v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 1081 (2d Cir. 1970) ("[T]he critical 
question in an action for infringement ... is likelihood of confusion .... "). 
43. 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968). 
44. R. G. Smith, 402 F.2d at 562. 
45. Jd. at 562-63. 
46. Jd. at 563. 
47. Jd. 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss3/8
1994] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 691 
In explaining its decision, the Ninth Circuit cited Saxlleher 
v. Wagner.48 In Saxlleher, the Court held that the defendant 
could use the plaintiff's trademark to identify a "bitter water" 
that the defendant was copying: 
They have a right to tell the public what they are 
doing, and to get whatever share they can in the 
popularity of the water by advertising that they 
are trying to make the same article, and think 
they succeed. If they do not convey, but, on the 
contrary, exclude, the notion that they are selling 
the plaintiff's goods, it is a strong proposition that 
when the article has a well known name they have 
not the right to explain by that name what they 
imitate. By doing so, they are not trying to get 
the good will of the name but the good will of the 
goods .. & 
The Ninth Circuit also relied on Societe Comptoir De 
L'Industrie .Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac v. Alexander's 
Department Stores, Inc. ~o In that case, the defendant advertised 
that its dresses were copies of trademarked Christian Dior 
dresses. The court reasoned: 
The Lanham Act does not prohibit a commercial 
rival's truthfully denominating his goods a copy 
of a design in the public domain, though he uses 
the name of the designer to do so. Indeed, it is 
difficult to see any.other means that might be em-
ployed to inform the consuming public of the true 
origin of the design. &1 
The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant may use the trade-
mark in its advertising to identify the product copied so long as 
it does not create a likelihood that purchasers will be confused 
as to the source, identity, or sponsorship of the advertiser's 
product.~2 
48. [d. at 564 (citing 216 U.S. 375 (1910)). 
49. R. G. Smith, 402 F.2d at 564 (quoting Saxllehner, 216 U.S. 375, 380-81). 
50. [d. at 565 (citing 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962)). 
51. R. G. Smith, 402 F.2d at 565 (quoting Societe Comptoir, 299 F.2d at 36). 
52. [d. at 563, 569. 
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C. DEFENSES TO TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
1. Defenses in General 
In addition to rebutting a plaintiff's prima facie case, other 
defenses are available to a defendant in a trademark infringe-
ment suit. One defense is the First Amendment defense. A 
trademark infringer may assert that the use of the trademark is 
protected by the First Amendment.1i3 
The district court in New Kids decided the case based on 
the First Amendment.1i4 The court stated that "the First 
Amendment provides immunity to the defendants . . . unless 
their use of the plaintiff's trademark was wholly unrelated to 
news gathering and dissemination, misleading as to content, or 
falsely and explicitly denoted authorship, sponsorship, or en-
dorsement by the New Kids on the Block."1i1i 
The district court found that the polls conducted by the de7 
fendants were a constitutionally protected news gathering activ-
ity because they intended to publish the results as news. liS The 
district court also found that the New Kids had not alleged that 
the newspapers' use of the "900" numbers was misleading as to 
content or that the newspapers misrepresented that the New 
Kids sponsored or endorsed the service.1i7 
A second defense to trademark infringement rests in the 
enumerated incontestability defenses of the Lanham Act.IiS The 
plaintiff's case fails if: (1) the registration or incontestability 
was obtained fraudulently,1i9 (2) the trademark has been aban-
53. See M.B.H. Enterprises, Inc. v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 56 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(acknowledging that the First Amendment was an issue in a trademark infringement 
suit, though deciding the case on other grounds); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. 
Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1979) (considering the First Amend-
ment as a possible defense, but rejecting it on the facts). 
54. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1547 (holding that the plaintiff's claims for trade-
mark infringement were barred by the First Amendment). 
55. [d. at 1541-42. 
56. [d. at 1545. 
57. Id. 
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (1988) (The defendant will prevail if one or more of the 
enumerated defenses applies). 
59. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(l). 
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doned,60 (3) the trademark holder or someone in privity with the 
trademark holder is using the trademark to misrepresent the ori-
gin of the goods or services,61 (4) the use is a fair use,62 (5) the 
defendant has used the trademark without knowledge of the reg-
istrant's prior use,63 (6) the defendant registered and used the 
trademark prior to the registration of the plaintiff's mark,6. (7) 
the trademark is being used to violate the antitrust laws of the 
United States,611 or (8) equitable principles, including laches, es-
toppel, and acquiescence, apply.66 
Because the Lanham Act specifies that the above are incon-
testability defenses,67 a court may require that a trademark have 
achieved incontestability before the defenses can be asserted.68 
Even if the trademark has not become incontestable, the equita-
ble defenses of laches, estoppel and acquiescence may still be 
available.69 
This article focuses on the fair use defense because of its 
similarity to the nominative use defense. 
2. The Fair Use Defense 
As noted above, the fair use defense is one of the enumer-
ated incontestability defenses of the Lanham Act. Section 
1115(b)(4) creates a defense to trademark infringement, 
provided: 
the name, term, or device charged to be an in-
fringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of 
the party's individual name in his own business, 
or of the individual name of anyone in privity 
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(2). 
61. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(3). 
62. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4). 
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5). 
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(6). 
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(7). 
66. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8). 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b). 
68. See, e.g., Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc., 739 F.2d 1415, 1423 (9th 
Cir. 1984) (reasoning that the fair use defense only applies to incontestable marks by the 
terms of the Lanham Act, but acknowledging that a common law fair use defense may 
exist). 
69. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) ("Any registration ... shall not preclude another person 
from proving any legal or equitable defense .... "). 
9
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with such party, or of a term or device which is 
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith 
only to describe the goods or services of such 
party, or their geographic origin .... 70 
The most common situation in which the fair use defense 
arises is where the plaintiff's trademark is somehow descriptive, 
and the defendant has used the trademark in a descriptive man-
ner. One such case is Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, 
Inc.71 In Zatarains, the plaintiff owned rights to the registered 
trademarks "Fish-Fri" and "Chick-Fri."72 The trademarks were 
used in connection with fried food coating mixes that the plain-
tiff sold in rectangular cardboard boxes.73 The defendants also 
marketed competing fried food coating mixes.7• One of the de-
fendants, Oak Grove Smokehouse, marketed its products in 
packets labeled with its name, emblem, and the terms "Fish 
Fry" or "Chicken Fry."71i The other defendant marketed a prod-
uct in a cylindrical container labeled "Visko's FISH FRY."78 
In its decision, the court described the fair use defense: 
The defense is available only in actions involving 
descriptive terms and only when the term is used 
in its descriptive sense rather than its trademark 
sense. In essence, the fair use defense prevents a 
trademark registrant from appropriating a de-
scriptive term for its own use to the exclusion of 
others, who may be prevented thereby from accu-
rately describing their own goods. The holder of a 
protectable descriptive mark has no legal claim to 
an exclusive right in the primary, descriptive 
meaning of the term; consequently, anyone is free 
to use the term in its primary, descriptive sense 
so long as such use does not lead to customer con-
fusion as to the source of the goods or services.77 
70. 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4). See also infra note 139 (enumerating the requirements of 
the fair use defense). 
71. 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983). 
72. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 788. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. Two other competing companies marketed fried food coatings using the 
terms "fish fry" or "chicken fry," but were not parties to the Zatarains litigation. Id. 
75. Id. 
76.Id. 
77. Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 791 (citations omitted). 
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The court in Zatarains then applied the fair use defense to the 
faCts. The court reasoned that other merchants were free to use 
the words "fish fry" and "chicken fry" in their ordinary descrip-
tive sense, as long as the use did not tend to confuse customers 
as to the source of the goods.78 The court found that the defend-
ants had used the terms in good faith because they had not used 
the terms in a trademark sense and never attempted to register 
the words as a trademark.79 The court also found that the de-
fendants had consciously packaged their goods to minimize con-
fusion. 80 As a result, the court held that the defendants were en-
titled to the fair use defense.81 
In Venetianaire Corp. of America v. A & P Import CO.,82 
the plaintiff had a registered trademark in the word "Hygient," 
which it used in connection with the sale of mattress covers.83 
The word "Hygient" was displayed in a white cross on a green 
oval and was printed on each of the plaintiff's packages.8• The 
defendant distributed substantially identical mattress covers.811 
The defendant's packages carried the word "Hygienic" in the 
cross and oval design with exactly the same placement on the 
package as the plaintiff's product.8s 
The court held that the defendant was not entitled to the 
fair use defense because the trademark was used in a trademark 
sense and was not used to describe the goods.87 The court rea-
soned that the protection afforded to trademarks focuses on the 
use of the words and not their meaning in the abstract.88 The 
court reasoned that had the defendant chosen a different trade-
mark and then used the word "Hygienic" in a sentence or placed 
the word "Hygienic" on the package, but not as part of the 
trademark, there would be no trademark infringement because 
78. Id. at 796. 
79.Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. 429 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1970). 
83. Venetianaire, 429 F.2d at 1080. 
84.Id. 
8S. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1082 (explaining that fair use requires that the use be "otherwise than as a 
mark ... only to describe the goods .... ") (citing IS U.S.C. §1l1S(b)(4)). 
88. Id. (emphasis in original). But ct. Zatarains, Inc. 698 F.2d at 791 ("The defense 
is available only in actions involving descriptive terms .... "). 
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this would be a descriptive use.89 
In WCVB-TV u. Boston Athletic Association,90 the Boston 
Athletic Association sued WCVB-TV for infringement of their 
registered trademark, "Boston Marathon."91 WCVB-TV broad-
casted the words "Boston Marathon" in connection with its cov-
erage of the event.92 
The First Circuit court explained the fair use defense: "In 
technical trademark jargon, the use of words for descriptive pur-
poses is called a 'fair use,' and the law usually permits it even if 
the words themselves constitute a trademark."93 The court then 
offered an example: "If . . . a t-shirt maker placed the words 
'Pure Cotton' (instead of the words 'Boston Marathon') on his t-
shirts merely to describe the material from which the shirts were 
made, not even a shirt maker who had a registered trademark 
called 'Pure Cotton' could likely enjoin their sale."94 The court 
reasoned that the mark was used primarily in a descriptive man-
ner, due to the "timing, meaning, context, intent, and surround-
ing circumstances," so that there was little likelihood of 
confusion. 911 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The New Kids brought trademark infringement claims 
against the newspaper defendants for using the New Kids' 
trademark in connection with their "900" number telephone 
polls.96 The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the New Kids' 
claims by stating that the court was "free to affirm on any 
ground fairly presented by the record"97 and that non-constitu-
89. See Venetianaire, 429 F.2d at 1082. 
90. 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991). 
91. WCVB-TV, 926 F.2d at 42-43. 
92. Jd. at 43. 
93, Jd. at 46 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1988); Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 796). 
94. Jd. (citing Leathersmith of London v. Alleyn, 695 F.2d 27, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1209 (1983). 
95. Jd. The court was not clear whether its refusal to reverse the district court was 
based on a finding of fair use or on a finding that there was no likelihood of confusion. 
96. New Kids, 745 F. Supp. 1540. 
97. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305 (citing Jackson v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 881 F.2d 
638,643 (9th Cir. 1989); Pelleport Inv., Inc. v. Budco Quality Theatres, 741 F.2d 273, 278 
(9th Cir. 1984». 
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tional grounds for decision are preferred over constitutional 
grounds.9s Thus, the Ninth Circuit reached the trademark in-
fringement claims that the district court did not because the 
Ninth Circuit bypassed the constitutional issue, whereas the dis-
trict court granted summary judgment on First Amendment 
grounds.99 
The Ninth Circuit next discussed the history and purpose of 
trademarks. Among the purposes identified were: identifying 
sources of goods and services,loo tracing defective wares,IOI re-
ducing consumer search costsl02 and preventing free-riding on a 
rival's reputation. l03 The Ninth Circuit concluded that trade-
mark infringement falls under unfair competition and is a form 
of fraud upon the consumer. 104 
The court then defined a trademark as a limited property 
right in a word, phrase, or symboPOIi The court noted, however, 
that an absolute restriction on the use of the trademark by any-
one other than its owner would deplete the language. loa In re-
sponse to this realization, courts recognize that the fair use de-
fense applies only when the trademark is used "to describe the 
goods or services of [a] party, or their geographic origin."107 
The court gave examples where it is inconvenient or impos-
sible to identify a product or service without using its trade-
mark. los In one example, the court reasoned that "one might re-
fer to the 'two-time world champions' or 'the professional 
basketball team from Chicago,' but it's far simpler (and more 
likely to be understood) to refer to the Chicago Bulls."109 In an-
98. Id. (citing In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 642-43 (1985); Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 
U.S. 569, 585 (1982». 
99. See New Kids, 745 F. Supp. at 1541-42. 
100. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305 (citing, SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS 
OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 47 (1925». 
101. Id. (citing SCHECHTER, supra note 100, at 47). 
102. Id. (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987». 
103. Id. (citing Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844». 
104. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305. 
105. Id. at 306. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. 1115(b)(4». See supra note 5 for the full text of 
§ 1115(b)(4). 
108. Id. at 306-07. 
109. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 306. 
13
Westberg: Intellectual Property Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994
698 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:685 
other example, the Ninth Circuit referred to a previous decision 
in which it allowed an auto repair shop to use the word "Volk-
swagen" to describe to the public the make of cars that it re-
pairs. llo Finally, the Ninth Circuit referred to the case where a 
television station was allowed to describe the event it was going 
to broadcast: the "Boston Marathon."lll The Ninth Circuit 
stated that these are examples of using a trademark in a non-
trademark sense, so infringement laws did not apply.ll2 
Next, the court introduced its new nominative use test by 
generalizing a class of instances where the trademark is not used 
to capitalize on confusion or to appropriate the "cachet" of one 
product for a different one: 
Such nominative use of a mark-where the only 
word reasonably available to describe a particular 
thing is pressed into service-lies outside the 
strictures of trademark law: Because it does not 
implicate the source-identification function that 
is the purpose of trademark, it does not constitute 
unfair competition; such use is fair because it 
does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by 
the trademark holder.l13 
The court explained that the nominative use test it was 
enunciating differs from the classic fair use defense because, in 
the classic fair use situation, the defendant has used the trade-
mark to describe the defendant's productY4 Here, the New Kids 
trademark has been used to describe the New Kids them-
selves. lUI The court made clear that it did not purport to alter 
the "paradigmatic" fair use test that applies when the defendant 
has used the trademark to refer to something other than the 
plaintiff's product.1l6 
The court outlined the requirements of the new, nominative 
use defense to trademark infringement: 
110. [d. at 307 (citing Volkswagen-werk Aktiengenesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 
350 (9th Cir. 1969». 
111. [d. (citing WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Ass'n, 926 F.2d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 1991)). 
112. [d. 
113. [d. at 307-08. 
114. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
115. [d. 
116. [d. 
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[W]here the defendant uses a trademark to de-
scribe the plaintiff's product, rather than its own, 
we hold that a commercial user is entitled to a 
nominative fair use defense provided he meets the 
following three requirements: First, the product 
or service in question must be one not readily 
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, 
only so much of the mark or marks may be used 
as is reasonably necessary to identify the product 
or service; and third, the user must do nothing 
that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest 
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark 
holder.l17 
699 
The Ninth Circuit next applied the nominative use test to 
the facts presented. The court compared the New Kids to the 
Chicago Bulls, Volkswagen and Boston Marathon situations, 
finding that it would be impossible for anyone who did not know 
the names of the individual New Kids to refer to them without 
using their trademark. u8 The court continued by stating that 
the New Kids deserve protection against copycats and false en-
dorsements, but not against "rendering newspaper articles, con-
versations, polls, and comparative advertising."1l9 Therefore, the 
first requirement of the nominative use test was met. 120 
Because THE STAR and USA TODAY only referred to the 
New Kids to the extent necessary to identify them as the subject 
of the polls and the distinctive logo was not used, the Ninth Cir-
cuit concluded that the second requirement was met as wel1. 121 
The court did not think that anything in the announce-
ments suggested joint sponsorship or endorsement by the New 
Kids. 122 In fact, the court pointed out that The USA TODAY poll 
implied the contrary by asking if the New Kids are a "turn 
Off."123 So, the court concluded that the third requirement was 
117. [d. 
118. [d. ("[H]ow could someone not conversant with the proper names of the indi-
vidual New Kids talk about the group at all.") 
119. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
120. [d. 
121. [d. 
122. [d. 
123. [d. at 308-09. 
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also satisfied.124 
The New Kids argued that the newspaper polls competed 
directly with the New Kids themselves.121i They reasoned that, 
even if newspapers are entitled to the nominative use defense, 
the polls should be excepted because they were not part of the 
news gathering activities of the newspapers. 126 Although the 
Ninth Circuit gave some credence to this argument, the court 
ultimately rejected it.127 The New Kids have a property right in 
their name, but cannot control how their fans spend money.128 
Because the use does not imply sponsorship or endorsement, the 
fact that it is done for profit is beside the point.129 The court 
compared the use to an unauthorized biography or a parody.130 
Therefore, the newspapers were entitled to the nominative 
use defense and summary judgment was proper for the first 
seven causes of action. l3l The Ninth Circuit continued by ad-
dressing the New Kids' three additional claims. 
The court rejected the commercial and common-law misap-
124. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 309. 
125. /d. 
126. /d. 
127. /d. (explaining that the New Kids' argument was "not entirely implausible"). 
128. /d. 
129. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 309 (citing Universal City Studios, v. Ideal Publishing 
Corp., 195 U.S.P.Q. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (holding that a magazine's use of TV program's 
trademark "Hardy Boys" in connection with photographs of the show's stars was not 
infringing); International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding no infringement where unauthorized jewelry maker produced 
rings and pins bearing fraternal organization's trademark)). 
130. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 309. 
A trademark may even be used lawfully in a way that many 
people, including· the trademark owner, may find offensive. 
Consider Girl Scout v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F. 
Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1969): Defendants published a poster 
showing "a smiling girl dressed in the well-known green uni-
form of the Junior Girl Scouts, with her hands clasped above 
her protruding, clearly pregnant abdomen. The caveat 'BE 
PREPARED' appears next to her hands." The court found no 
infringement: "[Rlational analysis of the situation does not in-
dicate a likelihood that the public will believe that the Girl 
Scouts are the authors of the poster to which they understand-
ably take such violent exception." 
New Kids, 971 F.2d at 307 n.5 (citations omitted). 
131. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 309. 
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propriation claims which were based on state law.132 Under Cali-
fornia law, the claims were barred if the trademark was used "in 
connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or 
account."133 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this provision ap-
plied to the telephone polls because the results were to be pub-
lished later as part of a news story.134 
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the New Kids' claim of in-
tentional interference with potential economic advantage. 1311 The 
court reasoned that "it is no tort to beat a business rival to pro-
spective customers,"136 nor is the use of a trademark a tort when 
the use has been found to be "fair and reasonable."137 Judge 
Kozinski summarized the Ninth Circuit's view of this last claim 
when he reminded the New Kids of the maxim: "all's fair in 
love, war and the free market."136 
V. CRITIQUE 
A. COMPARING THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOMINATIVE USE WITH 
THE REQUIREMENTS OF FAIR USE 
A comparison of the nominative use defense to the fair use 
defense reveals that the two defenses are largely duplicative and 
may lead to similar substantive results, making the nominative 
use defense unnecessary.139 In addition, we will see that nomina-
132. [d. 
133. [d. at 309-10 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d); Leidholdt v. L. F. P., Inc., 860 
F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989); Maheu v. CBS, 247 Cal. 
Rptr. 304, 312-13 (Ct. App. 1988); Eastwood v. Superior Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342, 349, 352 
(Ct. App. 1983) (extending the section 3344(d) defense to common law misappropriation 
claims)). 
134. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 310. 
135. [d. 
136. [d. (citing A-Mark Coin Co. v. General Mills, Inc. 195 Cal. Rptr. 859, 867 (Ct. 
App. 1983)); 5 BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW. Torts § 669 at 766 
(1988) ("[Olne competitor may induce customers of the other to do business with him."). 
137. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 310. 
138. [d. 
139. The requirements of fair use are: (1) the defendant used the word or symbol to 
merely describe its product, (2) that it did not use the word or symbol as a trademark, 
and (3) that it used the word or symbol in good faith. See, e.g., Institute for Scientific 
Info., v. Gordon and Breach, 743 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1990). These requirements are 
merely a court translation of the Lanham Act § 1115(b)(4). 
The requirements of the nominative use defense are: (1) the product or service in 
question must be one not readily identifiable without use of the trademark, (2) only so 
much of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the prod-
17
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tive use may be confusing. 
1. Trademark Necessary to Identify Product 
The first element of nominative use, that the product or ser-
vice in question must be one not readily identifiable without use 
of the trademark, may exist within the traditional fair use de-
fense. Recall that the fair use defense requires that the trade-
mark be used in a descriptive sense. 
In the Volkswagen repair shop situation, the Ninth Circuit 
permitted an auto repair shop to use the trademark "Volk-
swagen" to describe to the public the make of cars that it re-
paired.140 By using the trademark "Volkswagen," was the de-
fendant identifying the product of the plaintiff (nominative use) 
or was the defendant describing the defendant's own product 
(fair use)? The answer is the defendant was doing both. Simi-
larly, in New Kids, were the newspapers using the trademark 
"The New Kids" to identify The New Kids on the Block or to 
describe their own product: a New Kids on the Block telephone 
poll? The answer is they were doing both. From these examples, 
it seems that describing the defendant's product can be accom-
plished by identifying the plaintiff's product. The fair use de-
fense, however, includes additional descriptive uses such as in 
Zatarains 141 where the defendant described his product as "fish 
fry" even though the plaintiff's trademark was "Fish-Fri." 
Recall that one of the primary purposes of trademarks is to 
identify the source of goods or services.142 Consumers use trade-
marks to search out quality goods. They buy products they have 
bought in the past or that they have heard about through word-
of-mouth or advertising. Consumers, however, do not really care 
who produces the goods; they care only whether a particular 
trademark denotes products they want to buy.143 This is why 
uct or service, and (3) the user must do nothing that would, in conjunction with the 
mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder. New Kids, 971 F.2d 
at 308. 
140. Volkswagen-werk Aktiengenesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969). 
141. Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983). 
142. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 305 (citing SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE LAW RELATING TO TRADEMARKS 47 (1925». See supra note 100 and accompanying 
text. 
143. See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316, 
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companies expend effort advertising their products in such a 
way as to promote name recognition in their trademarks. The 
result is that trademarks may be the only way to readily identify 
particular goods and services because consumers do not know 
the name of their source. I44 The only goods or services that this 
would not apply to are those that have not achieved name recog-
nition. As the Ninth Circuit has indicated, it is often virtually 
impossible to refer to a product without using its trademark.1411 
This means that identifying a product by its trademark is just 
another way of describing the product. 
The Ninth Circuit provided little guidance to clarify the ap-
plication of the first element of nominative use.146 In applying 
the first element, the court reasoned that the New Kids' situa-
tion was similar to the Chicago Bulls, Volkswagen, and Boston 
Marathon situations indicating that there is no other reasonable 
way to describe the New Kids. I47 The court, however, went on to 
say that the New Kids deserved protection against copycats and 
false endorsements, but not against newspaper articles, conver-
sations, polls and comparative advertising.148 This statement 
seems to indicate that the New Kids deserve protection against 
likelihood of confusion (copycats, false endorsements, unfair 
comparative advertising), but not against First Amendment free-
doms (news dissemination, conversations and polls). Though this 
1324 (9th Cir. 1982) (reporting survey results where 65% of respondents who said that 
they had recently purchased the board game "Monopoly" or intended to purchase the 
game in the near future, chose: "I want 'Monopoly' primarily because I am interested in 
playing 'Monopoly,' I don't care much who makes it;" 32% chose: "I would like Parker 
Brother's 'Monopoly' game primarily because I like Parker Brother's products."); R. G. 
Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968) ("Preservation of the trademark 
as a means of identifying the trademark owner's products ... serves an important pub-
lic purpose. It makes effective competition possible in a complex, impersonal market-
place by providing a means through which the consumer can identify products which 
please him and reward the producer with continued patronage.") (footnote omitted). 
144. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308 ("[H]ow could someone not conversant with the 
proper names of the individual New Kids talk about the New Kids at all?"); Union Car-
bide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1976). Union Carbide, the owner of 
the trademark "EVEREADY" sued Ever-Ready, Inc. for using the term "Ever-Ready" in 
the sale of lamps and light bulbs. A survey conducted by a market research expert found 
that over 50% of those surveyed associated a lamp made by Ever-Ready, Inc. with Union 
Carbide's products, such as batteries, while only about 1 % associated the lamp with 
Union Carbide itself. [d. at 386. 
145. New Kids, 971 F.2d. at 306. 
146. See id. at 308-09. 
147. Id. at 308. 
148. Id. 
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is a valid point, it does not belong in the discussion of the first 
element of nominative use because it does not logically support 
the argument that the New Kids cannot be readily described 
without using their trademark. 
Consequently, the first requirement of nominative use, that 
the product not be readily identifiable without using its trade-
mark, is included within the fair use requirement that the trade-
mark be used in a descriptive sense. 
2. Trademark Use Limited to that Reasonably Necessary 
The limitation of the second element of nominative use, 
that the user may only use the mark as much as is reasonably 
necessary to identify the product or services, can be inferred 
from the fair use requirement of good faith. Good faith encom-
passes an absence of intent to defraud another or to seek an un-
conscionable advantage. u9 A defendant who uses a trademark 
more than is reasonably necessary to serve a legitimate purpose 
is arguably not acting in good faith. 1110 
In applying the second element, the court did not explain 
the scope of trademark use that fits within the doctrine's protec-
tion to define the "reasonably necessary" requirement of the sec-
ond element of nominative use. 11I1 In THE STAR, according to the 
Ninth Circuit's statement of the facts, the name of the group 
was used in an ad that ran next to a story about the group and a 
picture of the group was used with the ad!1I2 In USA TODAY, the 
name of the group was used and a picture of the group appeared 
next to the ad. The court did not apply the "reasonably neces-
sary" requirement of the nominative use defense to these facts. 
Therefore, the second requirement of nominative use, that 
the defendant. may only use the trademark as much as is reason-
149. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990). 
150. Compare Venetianaire Corp. of America v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079, 
1083 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding that defendant who adopted a trademark and packaging 
almost identical to the plaintiff's was not acting in good faith) with M.B.H. Enterprises 
v. WOKY, Inc., 633 F.2d 50, 54 (7th Cir. 1980) (finding good faith existed where the 
defendant had no intent to confuse the public). 
151. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
152. Id. at 304. 
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ably necessary to identify the product or services, is equivalent 
to the fair use requirement of good faith. 
3. No Suggestion of Sponsorship or Endorsement 
The third element of nominative use, that the user must do 
nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest spon-
sorship or endorsement of the trademark holder, must be satis-
fied as part of the plaintiff's prima facie case of infringement. 
Recall that the third element of the prima facie case for trade-
mark infringement is that the plaintiff must show likelihood of 
confusion as to the source of the products or services.l~3 The re-
quirement that there must be no suggestion of sponsorship or 
endorsement can be seen to be just a different way of stating 
that there must be no likelihood of confusion as to the source of 
the products or services. By making this requirement part of the 
nominative use defense, however, the Ninth Circuit shifts the 
burden of proof to the defendant whereas the Lanham Act 
places it on plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit did not purport to elimi-
nate this element from the prima facie case. Consequently, the 
result is that in a close case, where the burden of proof on this 
issue has not been met, it is unclear whether the plaintiff or de-
fendant should prevail. 
As with the first and second requirements of nominative 
use, the court performed little analysis to explain the third re-
quirement of the nominative use test.l~4 The court simply con-
cluded that there was no suggestion of sponsorship because 
neither ad suggested sponsorship, and USA TODAY asked if the 
New Kids were a "turn off."llili The third element, however, 
seems to require a somewhat subjective determination as to 
whether the use implies or does not imply sponsorship so that a 
clear articulation of which impression a consumer is likely to get 
may be difficult. 
The Ninth Circuit, however, may have purposely left its dis-
cussion of the application of all three parts of the nominative 
153. Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 802 F. Supp. 1386, 1394 (D.S.C. 1992) 
(citing Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
112 S. Ct. 373 (1991)); see supra notes 32 & 35 and accompanying text. 
154. New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308-09. 
155. Id. 
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use test somewhat bare in order to allow greater latitude to the 
district courts in the future. This may allow the district courts 
to expand upon the reasoning behind the nominative use doc-
trine in future cases. 
In New Kids, the Ninth Circuit could have affirmed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment on alternative grounds. 
The Ninth Circuit found that the third element of nominative 
use was satisfied. 1I16 This means that the New Kids failed to 
make out their prima facie case; the use of the New Kids' trade-
mark was not confusing because the use did not imply sponsor-
ship. Had the court adopted this reasoning, there would have 
been no need to address either the nominative use defense or 
the fair use defense. 
The Ninth Circuit stated that other courts hold, as a matter 
of law, that no sponsorship is implied when the trademark is 
used in a descriptive manner.1II7 This article has demonstrated 
that the third element of nominative use is included in the 
plaintiff's prima facie case. Even if it is not, it is implicitly in-
cluded in the good faith requirement of the fair use defense. In 
New Kids, because the newspapers satisfied the nominative use 
requirement that the user not do anything that would, in con-
junction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement of 
the trademark holder, the defendants also satisfy the fair use 
requirement of good faith. 
Therefore, each of the requirements of the nominative use 
defense is already a requirement of the fair use defense. More-
over, nominative use clouds the issue of who has the burden to 
prove likelihood of confusion. 
B. CAN NOMINATIVE USE BE DISTINGUISHED FROM FAIR USE? 
There may be three possible ways of distinguishing the 
nominative use defense from the fair use defense: whether the 
mark was used descriptively or was used otherwise than as a 
trademark, whether the use was descriptive of the plaintiff's or 
156. [d. at 308. 
157. [d. at 306. 
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the defendant's product and whether the defendant had profit 
as a motive. 
One element of the fair use defense, that the trademark 
must be used otherwise than as a mark/58 is not part of the 
nominative use defense. In this sense, the fair use defense is 
more restrictive than the nominative use defense. However, if a 
trademark is used in a descriptive sense, arguably it has not 
been used as a trademark. For example, we have already deter-
mined that the newspapers' use of the trademark "The New 
Kids" was descriptive in that it described the newspapers' polls 
and that the use was in good faith. It follows that the defend-
ants used the trademark otherwise than as a trademark in the 
sense that they did not adopt it as their own. Compare this situ-
ation to Venetianaire, where the use was as a trademark be-
cause the defendant adopted the plaintiff's trademark. I59 Also 
compare New Kids to R. G. Smith where the defendant was al-
lowed to actually use the plaintiff's trademark "Chanel No. 
5. "160 
Therefore, the fair use requirement that the trademark be 
used otherwise than as a trademark does not serve to distinguish 
nominative use from fair use. 
The Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish the two de-
fenses by stating that the fair use defense applies when the de-
fendant is describing the defendant's product, whereas the nom-
inative use defense applies when the defendant is describing the 
plaintiff or the plaintiff's product. I61 This distinction is confus-
ing because it is difficult to know if the nominative use defense 
or the fair use defense applies to a particular situation. As we 
saw before, it was not entirely clear whether the newspapers 
were describing their own service, the telephone poll, or the New 
Kids themselves. The trademark seems always to refer to the 
product associated with it: the plaintiff's product. Therefore, 
158. See supra note 5 for the full text of § 1115(b)(4). 
159. Venetianaire, 429 F.2d at 1082 ("[lIt is plain that A & P Import did not use 
the word otherwise than as a trade ... mark ... only to describe the goods.") (internal 
quotation omitted). 
160. R. G. Smith, 402 F.2d at 569 ("Appellants do not use appellees' trademark as a 
generic term. They employ it only to describe appellees' product, not to identify their 
own."). 
161. See New Kids, 971 F.2d at 308. 
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there does not seem to be a way of distinguishing fair use from 
nominative use. 
In addressing the New Kids' argument against the defend-
ant's commercial purpose and direct competition, the court held 
that a profit motive is not a factor in the nominative use de-
fense. 162 In so doing, the court may have avoided a potential 
problem with the application of this doctrine to other situations. 
In a capitalist society, almost every activity is arguably for 
profit. For example, even if the newspapers did not use "900" 
numbers, but used "800" numbers, the sale of the newspapers 
that included the poll results would still generate revenue. 
Profit motive, however, is not a factor in the fair use defense 
in trademark law. In the examples discussed so far, the defend-
ant did profit from using the defendant's trademark.163 Conse-
quently, profit motive does not serve to distinguish nominative 
use from fair use. 
C. NOMINATIVE USE ADDS TO EXISTING CONFUSION 
Courts do not always make a clear distinction between like-
lihood of confusion, an element of the prima facie case for trade-
mark infringement/64 and the descriptive sense of a trademark, 
an essential element of the fair use defense. 1611 Additionally, one 
court may choose to base its holding in a case on fair use, while 
another court may base its holding on lack of confusion when 
the facts of the two cases are the same or similar.166 
162. See id. at 309. 
163. WCVB-TV v. Boston Athletic Association, 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991); 
Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983); Venetian-
aire Corp. of America v. A & P Import Co., 429 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1970); R. G. Smith v. 
Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968); see supra notes 43-95 and accompanying text. 
164. Shakespeare, 802 F. Supp. at 1394; see supra notes 32 & 34 and accompanying 
text. 
165. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1988). 
166. See, e.g., Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Technologies, Inc., 935 F.2d 1122 (10th 
Cir. 1991). The Tenth Circuit held that no likelihood of confusion existed where the 
defendant used the plaintiff's registered trademark "Coherent" to describe its lasers. Id. 
at 1123, 1126. "Coherent" is a term that is descriptive of the light emitted from all lasers. 
Id. at 1123-24. The district court analyzed the fair use defense first, then the likelihood 
of confusion issue. Id. at 1124. The circuit court criticized the district court, stating, "By 
addressing the issues in this order, the district court left unclear the relationship be-
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An interesting point about the fair use defense was made in 
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema. 167 The court 
reasoned that it would be somewhat anomalous to apply a fair 
use defense to trademark infringement because that would mean 
that a use of a trademark that had first been found to be confus-
ing could then be found to be a fair use. 168 
As can be seen from the previous discussion of New Kids, 
the nominative use test seems likely to cause confusion and may 
be unnecessary due to its similarity to fair use. Also, it is unclear 
when nominative use or fair use should apply because the dis-
tinction between describing the trademark holder's product and 
the defendant's product is not very clear. The Ninth Circuit did 
not address or explain either of these concerns in New Kids. 
The Ninth Circuit has also added to existing confusion by 
including in the nominative use defense the requirement that 
the defendant do nothing to show sponsorship, whereas the Lan-
ham Act places the equivalent burden of proof on the plaintiff to 
show likelihood of confusion. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In New Kids, the Ninth Circuit introduced and explained a 
new nominative use test that applies when a defendant uses a 
rival's trademark as a means of identifying the rival's product. 
This nominative use doctrine seems to have some drawbacks 
which may make it difficult to apply. First, nominative use ap-
pears to be substantively equivalent to fair use. Second, nomina-
tive use clouds the issue of who carries the burden to prove like-
lihood of confusion. Third, it is unclear to which cases 
nominative use or fair use should be applied. 
Unless the Ninth Circuit is able to clarify the advantages 
tween incontestable status and the need ,to show likelihood of confusion." [d. The Tenth 
Circuit affirmed on the likelihood of confusion issue so that the fair use defense did not 
need to be addressed. [d. 
167. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 206 
n.9 (2d Cir. 1979). 
168. [d. ("Because the primary purpose of the trademark laws is to protect the pub-
lic from confusion, it would be somewhat anomalous to hold that the confusing use of 
another's trade.mark is 'fair use'.") (citations omitted). 
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and application of its nominative use defense, courts would be 
wise to discard the nominative use defense in favor of the fair 
use defense. 
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